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Introduction 
In response to the coronavirus2 pandemic in the United States, state and local officials 
issued a variety of public health orders designed to prevent or slow the spread of the virus across 
communities and to preserve medical resources for health care providers treating infected 
individuals suffering from the resulting disease—COVID-19.3 Business owners, church-goers, 
and others have challenged the constitutionality of many of these orders, claiming that stay-at-
home orders violate a variety of constitutionally protected rights, including the right to free 
exercise of religion, the right to free assembly, and the right to due process.4 These litigants often 
seek temporary injunctions against enforcement of public health measures as the parties prepare 
for hearings on permanent court orders.5 
                                                             
1Professor of Law, Center for Health Law Studies, Saint Louis University School of Law. I presented a version of the 
arguments in this essay as part of a virtual conference called “Isolated By the Law Part 2,” hosted by Wake Forest 
University School of Law on April 22, 2020. Thanks to Lyz Riley Sanders and Brian Gatter for their research. 
2 The coronavirus—or SARS-CoV-2—is the virus that causes the coronavirus disease of 2019, which is more 
commonly referred to as COVID-19. This essay uses the word “coronavirus” to refer to the virus and “COVID-19” to 
refer to the disease caused by the virus. 
3 2020 State and Local Government Responses to COVID-19, available at https://www.stateside.com/blog/2020-
state-and-local-government-responses-covid-19 (last visited July 19, 2020). 
4 See e.g., Planned Parenthood Center for Choice v. Abbott, __ F.Supp.3d __, 2020 WL 1502102 (W.D. Tex. 2020); 
On Fire Christian Ctr. v. Fischer, __ F.Supp.3d __ (W.D. Ky. Apr 2020); SH3 Health Consulting v. Page, __ F.Supp.3d 
__, 2020 WL 2308444 (E.D. Mo. 2020);  Legacy Church v. Kunkel, __ F.Supp.3d __, 2020 WL 1905586 (D. Mex. 
2020). 
5 See id. 
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In ruling on motions for temporary injunctions, many courts have held that the 1905 
decision by the Supreme Court of the United States in Jacobson v. Massachusetts6 is binding 
precedent for the doctrine that, during a public health emergency, courts must apply a highly 
deferential standard when assessing whether a government’s public health action violates 
liberties protected under the due process clause.7 The meaning of Jacobson is controversial, and 
the question of whether conventional substantive due process standards apply to public health 
measures during normal times or during an emergency is of great legal and practical importance; 
but it is not the issue this essay addresses.8 Rather, I accept—only for the sake of argument 
here—that a standard akin to abuse of discretion or perhaps rational basis scrutiny will be 
applied by courts now and in the future when reviewing constitutional challenges to public health 
measures, particularly public health measures taken during a declared emergency; and then I ask 
how that standard should be applied. 
This essay argues that judicial review of the constitutionality of state actions taken during 
a public health emergency must be constrained by a scientific focus, which is used to apply any 
standard of review. If and when a court assesses whether a public health order issued during an 
outbreak is “rational,” it must focus their attention on the known science of the infectious disease 
at issue as well as evidence of the efficacy of the government’s public health measure. Professor 
Scott Burris introduced this concept in 1989 and coined the phrase “focused scrutiny” to describe 
                                                             
6 197 U.S. 11 (1905). 
7 See e.g., In re Abbott, 954 F.3d 772, 783-786 (5th Cir. 2020). 
8 For an analysis of whether Jacobson should be used to suspend conventional constitutional review standards 
during an emergency, see generally Lindsay F. Wiley & Stephen I. Vladeck, Coronavirus, Civil Liberties and the 
Courts: the Case Against “Suspending” Judicial Review, 133 Harv. L. Rev. F. 179 (2020). For an analysis of how 
courts have misinterpreted Jacobson, see generally Jeffrey D. Jackson, Tiered Scrutiny in a Pandemic, 12 
ConLawNOW 39 (2020). For analysis of how constitutional doctrine with respect to public health measures taken 
during an infectious disease crisis is under-developed by courts and thus unclear, see generally Wendy E. Parmet, 
Quarantining the Law of Quarantine: Why Quarantine Law Does Not Reflect Contemporary Constitutional Law, 9 
Wake Forest J. L & Pol’y 1 (2018). 
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it.9 At the time, he argued that focused scrutiny (which he also called “rational medical basis” 
testing10) would help account for the fear and partisan politics that were driving government 
actions ostensibly taken to protect the public from the spread of HIV.11 In this essay, I argue that 
Burris’s “focused scrutiny” concept not only remains valuable in the judicial review of the 
constitutionality of public health measures today, but also that it is all the more necessary when 
both the government’s public health action and the constitutional review of that action occur 
during a declared emergency. 
 
The Rubber-Stamp Risk of a Public Health Emergency Standard of Constitutional Review 
At some point a judicial standard of review—on its face or as applied—becomes so 
deferential as to become meaningless, in which case courts understand their function as simply to 
rubber-stamp state action as constitutional.12 This is a serious risk associated with the “real and 
substantial relation” test that several federal courts have adopted to review the constitutionality 
of public health actions. Consider the test as recently described and applied by the Fifth Circuit 
in In re Abbott I.13 
In April 2020, the Governor of Texas ordered health care providers to suspend for several 
weeks all medical procedures and surgeries that were not necessary to save the life or limb of a 
                                                             
9 See Scott Burris, Rationality Review and the Politics of Public Health, 34 Vill. L. Rev. 933, __ (1989). 
10 See Id. at ___. 
11 See Id. at ___. 
12 By “rubber-stamp” I mean the automatic approval by courts of public health orders without proper or otherwise 
meaningful judicial review. At least one court during this pandemic has acknowledged the “rubber=stamp risk” 
associated with Jacobson’s “real and substantial relation” standard. See Bayley’s Campground Inc. v. Mills, __ 
F.Supp.3d __ , 2020 WL 2791797, *8 (D. Me. 2020) (“the permissive Jacobson rule floats about in the air as a 
rubber stamp for all but the most absurd and egregious restrictions on constitutional liberties, free from the 
inconvenience of meaningful judicial review”). 
13 954 F.3d 772 (5th Cir. 2020). 
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patient. The Governor’s claimed purpose for the order was to preserve medical resources for an 
anticipated surge of patients with COVID-19 in need of treatment. Abortion providers 
challenged the order as a violating the constitutional right of a women to obtain an abortion, and 
they sought a temporary restraining order (TRO) to enjoin the state from enforcing the order 
against abortion providers while the parties prepared for trial. The federal Court for the Western 
District of Texas granted the petitioner’s motion for TRO, holding that they were likely to 
succeed on the merits in establishing that the Governor’s order placed an undue burden on the 
right to obtain an abortion.14 
Texas officials immediately petitioned for and received a writ of mandamus from the 
Fifth Circuit ordering the federal district court to vacate its TRO. A writ of mandamus is an 
extraordinary measure of relief that is granted only in response to a “judicial usurpation of power 
or a clear abuse of discretion.” Here, the Fifth Circuit claimed that such a write was necessary 
because the federal district court had failed to apply or even acknowledge what the Court of 
Appeals called the “framework governing emergency exercises of state authority during a public 
health crisis, established over 100 years ago” in Jacobson. 
The Fifth Circuit described this framework and the judicial deference it demands in its 
application. The standard, said the Court, is applicable during a “public health crisis.” 
Additionally, the emergency standard articulated in Jacobson is based on the principle that 
individual liberties may be restrained “’by reasonable regulations’” at times when a community 
is “’under the pressure of great dangers.’” Under the Jacobson standard—at least as understood 
by the Fifth Circuit—a court may declare unconstitutional a law designed to protect the public 
                                                             
14 See Planned Parenthood Center for Choice v. Abbott, __ F.Supp.3d __, 2020 WL 1502102 (W.D. Tex. 2020). 
This preprint research paper has not been peer reviewed. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3690125
5 
 
health only when it “’has no real or substantial relation to those objects, or is, beyond all 
question, a plain, palpable invasion of rights secured by the fundamental law.’” Moreover, the 
Fifth Circuit emphasized that a reviewing court must defer to government with respect to its 
decision to enact a public health measure and its choice of which measures to enact, warning 
that, otherwise, a reviewing court would “’usurp the functions of another branch of 
government’” if it were to declare public health action unnecessary or arbitrary. 
The Fifth Circuit then summed up the applicable emergency standard of review: 
[W]hen faced with a society-threatening epidemic, a state may implement emergency 
measures that curtail constitutional rights so long as the measures have at least some “real 
or substantial relation” to the public health crisis and are not “beyond all question, a 
plain, palpable invasion of rights secured by the fundamental law.” [] Courts may ask 
whether the state’s emergency measures lack basic exceptions for “extreme cases,” and 
whether the measures are pretextual—that is, arbitrary or oppressive. [] At the same time, 
however, courts may not second-guess the wisdom or efficacy of the measures. 
There is a significant likelihood that this standard results in judicial rubber-stamping even when 
the standard is just taken at face value. Add to this the way the Fifth Circuit applied the standard 
when In re Abbott returned to that appellate court, and that likelihood increases all the more. 
Following the Fifth Circuit’s writ of mandamus, the district court vacated its original 
TRO, and the same abortion providers immediately sought and received a new TRO from the 
same district court. The second TRO was narrower and was based upon 31 findings of fact, one 
of which was that the Governor’s order suspending abortion procedures would result in greater 
use of medical resources because patients who remained pregnant as a result of the order would 
continue to require examination and treatment during the term of the order. The district court 
concluded that the order failed the standard established by Jacobson. Texas officials again 
petitioned the Fifth Circuit for a writ of mandamus with respect to this second TRO, and again 
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the Court of Appeals granted the writ.15 In so ruling, the Fifth Circuit chastised the district court 
for basing its decision in part on the finding that the Governor’s order works against its stated 
purpose by prolonging the time period during which a patient is pregnant and requires pre-natal 
care that uses valuable medical resources. The Court of Appeals held that this amounted to 
second-guessing a policy choice and usurping the powers of the executive branch. Moreover, the 
Court of Appeals used the pandemic as justification for its use of mandamus: 
‘the current global pandemic has caused a serious, widespread, rapidly escalating public 
health crisis in Texas. Petitioners’ interest in protecting public health during such a time 
is at its zenith. In the unprecedented circumstances now facing our society, even a minor 
delay in fully implementing the state’s emergency measures could have major 
ramifications ....’ 
The message is clear at least from the Fifth Circuit. Any lower court that fails to defer to 
the actions taken by the state in the name of public health, and does so during a declared disease 
emergency, has very likely abused its judicial discretion so dramatically as to justify mandamus 
even before the matter can go up on appeal. In essence, the Fifth Circuit has interpreted Jacobson 
to all but require a judicial rubber-stamp for the duration of the pandemic. 
The rubber-stamp risk is the risk that fear or politics—operating under the cover of an 
emergency—determines our public health response to an infectious disease outbreak rather than 
the best available scientific evidence about the disease and about the effectiveness of various 
response options. It is the risk that individuals are unnecessarily or even irrationally deprived of 
personal liberties. And it is the risk that the citizenry loses its confidence in our public health 
system, perceiving it as untethered from science and just another arena for partisan politics.  
 
                                                             
15 The Court grated in part and denied in part the petition for writ of mandamus. 
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Two Ebola Rulings and the Risk of Unfocused Scrutiny 
  The need for focus judicial review on the science of an infectious disease outbreak is 
most obvious from an examination of two federal court rulings that upheld state quarantines of 
individuals exposed to Ebola but who did not have any symptoms of the disease. In each case the 
judge failed to account for the particular nature of Ebola and instead lumped Ebola into a broad 
category of dangerous infectious diseases for which quarantines had been ordered and upheld as 
constitutional. 
 As a reminder, Ebola—unlike measles or even the coronoavirus—is not easily 
transmissible human-to-human.16 Ebola transmission occurs when an uninfected person comes 
into direct contact with the “wet” symptoms (vomit, feces, blood) of a person in the throes of the 
illness.17 Ebola has other symptoms—“dry” symptoms such as fever, nausea, and malaise—that 
precede the wet symptoms by a day or more.18 The dry symptoms do not pose a significant risk 
of transmission, but they are a natural early warning that the person experiencing those 
symptoms should be put into isolation in anticipation of the onset of the dangerous wet 
symptoms.19 
Many people were unnecessarily quarantined during the 2014 Ebola scare in the United 
States.20 The constitutionality of only two state quarantine orders were subject to judicial 
                                                             
16 See Ebola Virus Disease, WHO, available at https://www.who.int/en/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/ebola-virus-
disease (last visited July 20, 2020). 
17 See id. See also Gustavo E. Velásquez et al., Time From Infection to Disease and Infectiousness for Ebola Virus 
Disease, A Systematic Review, 61 Clinical Infectious Diseases 1135, 1135 (2015). 
18 See id. 
19 Robert Gatter, Three Lost Ebola Facts and Pandemic Preparedness, 12 St. Louis U. J. Health L. & Pol’y 191, 198 
(2018). 
20 ACLU & Yale Global Health Justice Partnership, Fear, Politics and Ebola: How Quarantines Hurt the Fight Against 
Ebola and Violate the Constitution 29 (2015, available at 
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/aclu-ebolareport.pdf (last visited July 20, 2020).  
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review.21 In one case, a nurse—Kacie Hickox—who had volunteered to treat Ebola patients in 
west Africa was quarantined by the State of New Jersey when she re-entered the U.S. at Newark 
International Airport. In the other, a family from Liberia was quarantined by Connecticut 
officials when the family, traveling on a valid visa, visited the state. None of the individuals 
displayed the dry or wet symptoms associated with Ebola.22  
Each plaintiff sued state officials under §1983 claiming that the quarantines had violated 
their constitutionally guaranteed due process rights and seeking compensation.23 In both cases, 
the federal courts dismissed the claims based on the defendants’ qualified immunity.24 
 The federal district courts in New Jersey and Connecticut addressed whether the actions 
of state officials in quarantining the plaintiffs violated their clearly established legal rights. Each 
Court looked to Jacobson to assess the plaintiffs’ substantive due process rights, and each Court 
held that a quarantine is unconstitutional only if it lacks a “real or substantial relation” to the 
public health goal of preventing the spread of a dangerous infectious disease. Each judge then 
analogized to a federal case upholding the quarantine of a person exposed to smallpox and who 
could not prove that she had been vaccinated for the disease.25 From this, the Courts concluded 
that it is reasonable for state officials to quarantine anyone exposed to a dangerous infectious 
disease and to do so for the remaining duration of the disease’s incubation period. Because the 
                                                             
21 See Hickox v. Christie, 205 F. Supp. 3d 579 (D.N.J. 2016); Liberian Cmty. Ass'n of Conn. v. Malloy, No. 3:16-cv-
00201(AVC), 2017 WL 4897048 (D. Conn. Mar. 30, 2017). 
22 The state of New Jersey claimed that Kaci Hickox registered a slight fever when she was first examined after her 
plane landed, but officials took her temperature repeatedly after that initial check using more accurate 
thermometers, and none of those readings indicated that she had a fever. Compl. at par. 31, 49, 56-61, Hickox v. 
Christie, 2015 WL 6438125 (Oct. 22, 2015).  
23 See Hickox v. Christie, 205 F. Supp. 3d 579 (D.N.J. 2016); Liberian Cmty. Ass'n of Conn. v. Malloy, No. 3:16-cv-
00201(AVC), 2017 WL 4897048 (D. Conn. Mar. 30, 2017). 
24 See id. 
25 Hickox v. Christie, 205 F. Supp. 3d 579, 592 (D.N.J. 2016); Liberian Cmty. Ass'n of Conn. v. Malloy, No. 3:16-cv-
00201(AVC), 2017 WL 4897048, __ (D. Conn. Mar. 30, 2017). 
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quarantine orders reviewed in each of these two Ebola cases were based on the facts that each 
plaintiff had been exposed to Ebola, that Ebola has a two-week incubation period, and that each 
quarantine was ordered only for the duration of the incubation period for each plaintiff, the 
quarantines were rational, and the plaintiffs’ due process rights were not violated. 
Neither Court, however, accounted for ways that Ebola is different from smallpox and 
how these differences undercut any rationale state officials could have to quarantine someone 
exposed to Ebola who does not show any symptoms of the disease. Had these judges considered 
the well-known facts about the way Ebola is transmitted, the way the disease progresses in a 
person, and the timing and risks posed by the disease’s symptoms, it stands to reason that they 
would have ruled differently. Quarantining a person exposed to Ebola and who is not 
experiencing the preliminary dry symptoms is unreasonable and arbitrary because no such person 
has ever transmitted the disease to another. At most, health officials are justified in ordering that 
such individuals be subject to ongoing monitoring so as to determine whether they ever 
experience the dry symptoms. 
By failing to focus on the science of Ebola, and by instead rubber-stamping the actions of 
New Jersey and Connecticut officials, these two federal courts upheld public health measures 
that unnecessarily deprived several individuals of their personal freedoms. These judges missed 
the opportunity to declare unconstitutional the policy of many states during the Ebola scare to 
quarantine asymptomatic individuals who were exposed to the disease. One consequence of 
those state policies—during the scare—was to reduce the number of health care and public 
health professionals willing to volunteer to treat Ebola at its source in West Africa so as to help 
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prevent its spread to the U.S. and elsewhere.26 By failing to set the constitutional record straight 
even after the scare was over, these Courts undermined our preparedness for future pandemics by 
perpetuating the chilling effect of arbitrary state polices born out of fear of an infectious disease. 
 
Focused Scrutiny and Its Value During a Pandemic 
 Focused scrutiny, as envisioned by Professor Burris, requires a rational medical basis for 
public health actions taken by government: 
The test . . . places a medical limitation on state policymaking that has two distinct 
components. The first, a requirement that the decision be medically justified, precludes 
all manner of other possible explanations for a health measure, from preserving social 
morale to saving money. Whatever explanations are offered of the means and ends of the 
measure must be medical ones. But the requirement does more than limit the universe of 
justifications: the Court's specification that the medical judgment be “reasonable” 
precludes the kind of logical but far-fetched claims that would be enough to sustain an 
action under the rational basis test. . . . A challenger carries her burden only if she can 
show that the health measure in question is not medically reasonable under the actual 
conditions in which it is applied. Mere disagreement between medical authorities, or 
uncertainty as to the value of the chosen action, will not be enough.27 
 Burris derived this test from a Supreme Court ruling School Board of Nassau Cty, Fla. V. 
Arline.28 It was not a constitutional ruling. Instead, the issue was how to apply a federal disability 
discrimination statute in the case of a teacher who was discharged by a public school district 
form her faculty position because she had tuberculosis, which could become active from time to 
time. The district was concerned that the teacher might infect students or others at school if her 
disease became active while she was employed. The statute prohibited discrimination against any 
person is disabled or perceived as disabled, which—the Court ruled—included someone with or 
                                                             
26 See Gatter, supra note __ at __. 
27 Burris, supra note __, at 978-979. 
28 480 U.S. 273 (1987). 
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perceived to have a dangerous infectious disease. But the protection applied only when the 
person is “otherwise qualified” for the benefit at issue. The Supreme Court addressed the 
question of what “otherwise qualified” means in the context of a person with or perceived to 
have an infectious disease. The Court held that federal courts, when assessing whether a person 
with a contagious disease is “otherwise qualified” for employment, must make: 
’[findings of] facts, based on reasonable medical judgments given the state of medical 
knowledge, about (a) the nature of the risk (how the disease is transmitted), (b) the 
duration of the risk (how long is the carrier infectious), (c) the severity of the risk (what is 
the potential harm to third parties) and (d) the probabilities the disease will be transmitted 
and will cause varying degrees of harm.’ In making these findings, courts normally 
should defer to the reasonable medical judgments of public health officials.29 
 These, Burris says, are the elements for assessing the rationality of any public health 
measure taken to prevent the spread of an infectious disease. He argues that these elements 
should guide the way courts apply the conventional rational basis test when reviewing the 
constitutionality of government actions designed to control a communicable disease. 
By constraining courts to an assessment of the best available scientific information about 
a disease, focused scrutiny narrows the scope of a judge’s inquiry into the rationality of public 
health measures. Yet, it does not otherwise alter the rational basis standard. Focused scrutiny 
“does not shift the burden of justification to the state. The state does not need to prove that it is 
right, but only to produce a reasonable medical judgment suggesting that it is not wrong.”30 
Additionally, focused scrutiny would not “change the [deferential] nature of the constitutional 
inquiry. In the rational basis health case, the court does not sit to choose or require the ‘best 
                                                             
29 480 U.S. 273, 288 (1987), quoting Amicus Brief from the American Medical Association. 
30 Burris, supra note __, at 978. 
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solution,’ but only to guarantee that the challenged state action has enough of a medical basis to 
be reasonable in public health terms.”31 
 Focused scrutiny should be expanded to include more explicitly an inquiry into the likely 
effectiveness of the public health measures taken by government. Whether a rational basis exists 
to believe that a quarantine order or other governmental action will result in achieving the public 
health goal is a necessary part of applying rational basis testing. The list of findings as articulated 
by the Supreme Court in Arline, however, does not address this, most probably because the Court 
was addressing the meaning and application of the “otherwise qualified” element of the relevant 
federal disability discrimination statute. The Court was not conducting a rational basis test of the 
school district’s action. Professor Burris’s test accounts for this generally when it states that 
focused scrutiny requires a showing that there is medically rational basis for the means-end 
nexus.32 So I add to the test that courts determine whether, given available and reliable evidence, 
there is a reasonable medical or public health basis for the government to believe that action it 
has chosen to take can serve the government’s stated goal. 
 This means-ends step of the focused scrutiny standard likely has more teeth today than it 
did when Professor Burris developed the concept in 1989. Legal epidemiology—“the scientific 
study of law as a factor in the cause, distribution and prevention of disease and injury”33—was 
created and developed into a field of study since then.34 Researchers in the field have published 
                                                             
31 Id. at 979. 
32 See Burris supra note __. 
33 National Environmental Health Association, Legal Epidemiology, available at https://www.neha.org/legal-
epidemiology#:~:text=Legal%20epidemiology%20is%20an%20emerging,prevention%20of%20disease%20and%20i
njury (last visited July 20, 2020). 
34 Indeed Professor Burris is a founder of the field and is one of the co-authors of a leading treatise. See generally 
Scott Burris, Micah L. Berman, Matthew Penn & Tara Ramanathan Holiday, The New Public Health Law: A 
Transdisciplinary Approach to Practice and Advocacy (2018). 
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and continue to publish a wide variety of empirical studies measuring the effectiveness of public 
health law and policy interventions.35 With such a rich source of evidence about what works and 
what does not work to promote public health, courts should hold health officials accountable to 
that data when assessing whether governmental action to control an infectious disease has a 
rational medical basis. 
 Because focused scrutiny probes the logic underlying public health actions when 
assessing its constitutionality, it is analogous to judicial “hard look” review of administrative 
agency actions.36 When reviewing discretionary actions by administrative agencies to determine 
whether they can be set aside as arbitrary or capricious or an abuse of discretion, courts 
thoroughly parse the logic of the agencies decisions in its rigorous application of an otherwise 
deferential standard of review.37 The Supreme Court has held that the test requires courts to 
determine “whether the [agency’s] decision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors 
and whether there has been a clear error of judgment.”38 The Court described this as “a thorough, 
probing, in-depth review.”39 Ultimately, however, this probe into the agency’s analysis does not 
change the deferential nature of the standard of review.  “Although this inquiry into the facts is to 
                                                             
35 The Community Guide, for example, conducts and publishes systematic reviews of public health law and policy 
effectiveness data. See generally the Community Guide available at https://www.thecommunityguide.org/ (last 
visited July 20, 2020). 
36 Indeed, I have argued elsewhere that individuals seeking to challenge public health measures, including 
quarantine, may be more successful challenging the action under the relevant administrative procedures act and 
bypassing the qualified immunity barrier that accompanies a section 1983 claim. See Gatter, supra note __, at 209-
210. 
37 See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415-16 (1971). This test is informally known as 
the “hard look” standard of review. See Michael Asimow & Ronald M. Levin, State and Federal Administrative Law 
592 (3d ed. 2009). 
38 Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971). 
39 Id. at 415. 
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be searching and careful, the ultimate standard of review is a narrow one. The court is not 
empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the agency.”40 
 A leading value of focused scrutiny in the application of rational basis testing is that it 
provides a structure for deploying the relatively deferential test so as to prevent courts from 
rubber-stamping public health measures reflexively. Consider, for example, how focused 
scrutiny likely would changed the outcome in the two Ebola cases summarized above. Had each 
judge been forced by the legal standard to make finding of fact based then-existing medical 
knowledge about the modes of Ebola transmission and the probability in these cases that Ebola 
would be transmitted to others via those modes, the Courts would have had their attention drawn 
to the absence of any significant transmission risk posed by the returning nurse and the visiting 
Liberian family members. In the absence of any such risk, the Courts would have been hard-
pressed to conclude that the state officials’ quarantine orders were not reasonable or rational and 
that they did not have a “real or substantial relation” to the purpose of the quarantine, which was 
to prevent the transmission of Ebola to others. 
 Focused scrutiny also would undercut the Fifth Circuit’s holding in In re Abbott that the 
lower court usurped the power of the executive branch by second-guessing whether an order 
suspending abortion procedures in Texas could rationally achieve the state’s goal of conserving 
medical resources for the treatment of COVID-19 patients.41 Given that the focused scrutiny 
standard would require a court to assess that there is a rational medical basis for the Governor of 
Texas to conclude that keeping more people pregnant by suspending abortions would reduce the 
use of medical resources that might otherwise be needed to treat COVID-19 patients, the district 
                                                             
40 Id. at 416. 
41 See supra notes __ through __ and the associated text. 
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court’s inquiry and finding is not only appropriate, but mandatory. It would hardly be a basis for 
the Fifth Circuit to take the dramatic and extraordinary step of issuing a writ of mandamus. 
 Moreover, focused scrutiny would bring additional value to judicial review of the 
constitutionality of public health measures, particularly those reviewed during a declared disease 
emergency. As exemplified by the Fifth Circuit’s In re Abbott opinion in support of its issuing a 
second writ of mandamus, when a public health emergency exists courts perceive that they owe 
even greater deference to state officials because the interests of the state are “at their zenith” and 
a judge does not want to be the cause of “even a minor delay in fully implementing the state’s 
emergency measures” that, in turn, “could have major [public health] ramifications.” Thus, the 
rubber-stamp risk is most likely to materialize when courts perceive that they owe deference to 
state officials multiple times over: (1) because the legal standard calls for deference, (2) because 
state health officials have expertise in public health that the court lacks, and (3) because the 
community is in the midst of an emergency that requires quick action by the state. Focused 
scrutiny provides judges with a specific standard for making factual inquiries efficiently and for 
doing so while still respecting the legal standard and the expertise of public health officials. 
 Moreover, judges are human and subject to the same fears as others over the spread of a 
dangerous infectious disease. Judges are susceptible to making significant logical errors as a 
result of intuitive, snap judgments deriving from their human emotions.42 In this way, the 
specificity of the findings required under focused scrutiny could serve to offset the potential for 
judges to allow personal fear to undermine the rigor of their reviews. 
                                                             
42 See Andrew J. Wistrich, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Chris Guthrie, Heart Versus Head: Do Judges Follow the Law or 
Follow Their Feelings?, 93 Tex. L. Rev. 855, 862-874 (2015). 
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 Finally, as mentioned at the outset of this essay, focused scrutiny has the potential to 
maintain public confidence in our public health system by more closely tethering governmental 
actions taken during a disease emergency to the available science about the disease. The more 
evident that science is driving governmental response, the less likely the public is to perceive that 
fear or partisan politics undermining public health. This seems particularly valuable during our 
current pandemic when public confidence in health officials is at risk because of incompetence 
and the influence of partisan politics.43 
 
Conclusion 
 Courts have ruled on a variety of public health orders from state and local governments 
during the current COVID-19 pandemic. And many more judicial opinions will be written on 
constitutional challenges to mask-wearing requirements, to protocols for opening public schools, 
new stay-at-home orders re-closing and re-opening (again) businesses as cases wax and wane, 
and—one day—to vaccine mandates and exemptions. 
 If the current trend continues, we should expect that many courts will rely on Jacobson v. 
Massachusetts (however erroneously) to hold that public health measures taken by governments 
during the pandemic are subject only to rational basis testing. When this happens, judges should 
apply this relatively deferential standard of review based on the focused scrutiny standard 
originated by Professor Burris and re-articulated here. It is a tool to offset the risk of judicial 
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rubber-stamping, to defend against public health policy driven by fear or politics, and to 
strengthen the scientific basis of public health measures taken during the pandemic. 
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